Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky by Adler, Jonathan H.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2008 
Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky 
Jonathan H. Adler 
Case Western University School of Law, jonathan.adler@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Repository Citation 
Adler, Jonathan H., "Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky" (2008). Faculty 
Publications. 513. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/513 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307177
983 
  
GETTING THE ROBERTS COURT RIGHT:  
A RESPONSE TO CHEMERINSKY 
JONATHAN H. ADLER† 
Table of Contents 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 983 
II. THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING DOCKET ............................................. 987 
III. “THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURT SINCE THE MID-1930S”?....... 992 
IV. A “PRO-BUSINESS” COURT?......................................................... 1002 
V. COURTING JUSTICE KENNEDY...................................................... 1008 
VI. WHEN THE ROBERTS COURT COMES OF AGE .............................. 1011 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Roberts Court is a work in progress. The October 2008 Supreme 
Court term will be only the third in which both Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito have sat together for the 
entire term.1 Any assessment of the Court at this point is necessarily 
tentative and somewhat impressionistic. The data from which one can 
draw conclusions is quite limited and not necessarily representative of 
the Court’s work. A given justice’s current behavior on the Court is not 
necessarily indicative of the future, as some justices “grow” or evolve 
once on the bench.2 Changes in personnel can also alter the Court’s 
internal dynamic and with unpredictable effects.3   
 † Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., 1991, Yale University; J.D., 2000, 
George Mason University. The author would like to thank Jonathan Entin, Michael 
Greve, and B. Jessie Hill for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any remaining 
errors or inanities are sole responsibility of the author. 
 1. Samuel Alito was sworn in as the 110th Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on 
January 31, 2006, and only participated in part of the October Term 2005. See Charles 
Babington, Alito Is Sworn in on High Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2006, at A01, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR200708140101-
5.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 2. See Lee Epstein, et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, 
When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (documenting the 
frequency of “ideological drift” by Supreme Court Justices). According to one recent 
study examining the voting patterns of Supreme Court justices from 1937-2005, 
“ideological drift is pervasive.” Id. at 1486. The most obvious contemporary example of 
this would be Justice David Souter, who voted more frequently with the “conservative” 
justices on the Court in his first few terms on the Court than he does today. Id. at 1508-09 
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Any assessment of the Roberts Court at age three is necessarily 
tentative and preliminary. Yet there is a tendency toward premature 
pronouncements and exaggerated assessments. Court commentators 
exhibit a reflex to cast the Court in a predetermined narrative about its 
prospects and pronouncements. This same tendency produces overly 
confident and conclusory assessments that stray beyond the available 
evidence. Small doctrinal shifts are presented as seismic changes; ripples 
in the Court’s jurisprudence are proclaimed tsunamis. Editorials and 
pundits proclaim trends and transformations that have yet to manifest 
themselves. 
This tendency was on display at the close of the October Term (OT) 
2006 as court commentators proclaimed the arrival of a triumphant 
conservative majority on the Supreme Court. Jeffrey Toobin wrote of a 
“dramatically more conservative” Supreme Court with a majority intent 
on launching a conservative “counterrevolution” in American law.4 The 
Washington Post reported a “steady and well-documented turn to the 
right.”5 Ronald Dworkin warned of an “unbreakable phalanx” of 
conservative justices6 and The New York Times’ Linda Greenhouse 
reported that the confirmations of Roberts and Alito had created the 
“Court that conservatives had long yearned for and that liberals feared.”7  
Reports of a conservative ascendance are premature. OT 2006 
certainly featured numerous 5-4 decisions, many of which produced what 
could be called “conservative” results.8 Yet there were also substantial 
  
(stating that Justice Souter was the median justice on the Court when first appointed but 
“has grown strikingly more liberal with nearly each passing term”). A similar trend was 
observed with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Id. at 1526 (stating that Justice O’Connor 
“made a slow and gradual move to the left” after her first ten years on the Court). 
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 569 (2003). As Professor Merrill observed, 
one characteristic of the later Rehnquist Court was the unprecedented level of continuity 
in the Court’s lineup. Id. at 573. 
 4. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 8, 
324 (2007). 
 5. Robert Barnes, A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define Court This Term, 
WASH. POST, Jul. 1, 2007, at A07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/30/AR2007063000795.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 6. RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX: THE COURT’S NEW RIGHT-
WING BLOC 47 (2008). 
 7. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/washington/-
01scotus.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/S/Stevens,%20John%20Paul 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 8. See Lee Epstein, et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why 
Conservatives Should Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. 
REV. 651, 652 (2008) (noting that “the 2006 term, in particular, was a good one for 
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victories for “liberal” positions the proportion of cases in which 
conservative positions prevailed was not out of line with prior years.9 
More importantly, the Court’s slim docket that term was hardly 
representative of the full range of issues the Court confronts. Only one 
year later commentators were forced to reassess as OT 2007 produced 
fewer ideologically divided decisions in which the conservative justices 
carried the day.10 It is difficult to characterize the Court that produced 
Kennedy v. Louisiana11 and Boumediene v. Bush12 as particularly 
“conservative” or “right-wing.” 
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky makes a substantial contribution to the 
narrative of conservative ascendance in The Roberts Court at Age 
Three.13 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito “have been everything 
that conservatives could have dreamed of and liberals could have 
feared,” he writes.14 The two newest justices are forging “a solid 
conservative voting majority” on the Court.15 The result is a Court that is 
“notably more conservative” than its predecessors on most contentious 
questions.16 It is, Dean Chemerinsky claims, “the most conservative 
Court since the mid-1930s.”17 
To say Dean Chemerinsky overstates his case is an understatement. 
Even assuming one can offer a definitive assessment of the Roberts 
Court’s first three years, there is little support for the claim it is the “most 
  
conservatives,” but that “empirical scrutiny of the Court’s voting patterns reveals no 
significant distinctions between the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts”).  
 9. For instance, the five most conservative justices on the Court in a majority of the 
term’s 5-4 cases in OT 05 (fifty-five percent), OT 00 (fifty-four percent), and OT 99 
(sixty-six percent). Perhaps more notable, in OT 99, the Court’s four most liberal justices 
only prevailed in one of the term’s twenty-one 5-4 decisions in OT 99. See SCOTUSblog, 
End-of-Term “Super StatPack—OT06, June 28, 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 
2009). 
 10. This is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler, What Happened to the “Conservative 
Court”?, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 30, 2008), available at http://article.national-
review.com/?q=YTM3OGI1MzNmMDJkOTdhM2QzZjU2NjBiMjFiMmRhNTM= (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 11. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), petition for reh’g denied 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008). 
 12. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 13. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947 
(2008). 
 14. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 956. 
 15. Id. at 955. 
 16. Id. at 956. Dean Chemerinsky further asserts that: “The one area where the 
Roberts Court has not been conservative is in its rulings against the Bush 
Administration’s actions as to the Guantanamo detainees.” Id.  
 17. Id. at 962. 
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conservative” in seven decades, however “conservative” is defined.18 
Even if one evaluates the Court’s ideological orientation solely with the 
evidence Dean Chemerinsky offers, the claim buckles. Viewed in light of 
the Roberts Court’s entire record thus far, the charge falls apart.  
The Roberts Court has issued its share of conservative rulings, 
though most of these have been relatively modest.19 At the same time, it 
has issued many decisions that are quite liberal.20 Among other things, 
the Roberts Court has: issued the most expansive and permissive 
standing opinion since the 1970s;21 invalidated the application of the 
death penalty based, in part, on appeals to international law;22 and 
engaged in the most aggressive exercise of judicial review of wartime 
measures adopted by the political branches in our nation’s history.23 
Whatever one’s views of the merits of these decisions, they are not the 
product of the “most conservative” Court in over a generation.24 
Accepting the limited ability to draw definitive conclusions about the 
Roberts Court at this point, it is fair to say the Court is moderately more 
conservative than it had been immediately before. Chief Justice Roberts 
has not shown himself to be any more conservative than his predecessor 
and mentor, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. If anything, he is 
slightly more deferential to precedent. Justice Alito, on the other hand, is 
both more conservative and consistent than was Justice O’Connor. Those 
  
 18. The terms “liberal” and “conservative” are used throughout this paper in 
accordance with the common vernacular. It should be noted, however, that these labels 
are often misleading and imprecise when used to describe court decisions and doctrines, 
particularly insofar as these labels are affixed to the results or practical consequences of 
decisions rather than to the holdings or interpretive methodologies employed by the Court 
or individual justices. So, for instance, while judicial decisions unfavorable to criminal 
defendants are often characterized as “conservative,” some conservative justices have 
authored opinions quite protective of criminal defendants. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect 
radiation of heat from a private home is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment) 
(opinion by Scalia, J.); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that 
criminal forfeiture constituted excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment) 
(opinion by Thomas, J.).  
 19. See infra notes 65-121 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 107-121 and accompanying text. 
 21. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The most 
expansive and permissive standing opinion in the Court’s history was United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Problems, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See also 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is SCRAP 
for a new generation.”). 
 22. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641. 
 23. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229. 
 24. See L. Epstein, et al., Bush Imprint, supra note 8, at 652 (noting similarity 
between Rehnquist and Roberts Courts). 
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areas in which the Court has become slightly more conservative are those 
on which Justice Alito is to Justice O’Connor’s right. Nonetheless, the 
confirmation of Justice Alito has yet to produce anything approaching 
revolutionary change, in part because Justice Kennedy remains a 
moderate median justice on many issues. Thus the most we can say at 
this point is that the Roberts Court appears moderately more conservative 
than its immediate predecessors, but remains under construction. 
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Part I places the 
current Court and its docket in broader historical and institutional 
context, with a particular focus on the Court’s diminished caseload. Part 
II challenges Dean Chemerinsky’s central claim that the Roberts Court at 
age three has shown itself to be “the most conservative Court since the 
mid-1930s.” This part demonstrates that Dean Chemerinsky’s claim is 
difficult to maintain even considering alternative potential definitions of 
what it would mean for this to be the “most conservative” Court. Part III 
focuses on Dean Chemerinsky’s subordinate claim that the Roberts Court 
is exceedingly or notably “pro-business.” This part considers what it 
would mean to have a “pro-business” court, and whether the current 
Court fits this definition. Part IV considers Dean Chemerinsky’s 
additional suggestion that the Roberts Court should be known as the 
“Kennedy Court,” and its implications for his broader thesis. This Essay 
closes with an assessment of what can—and cannot—be said about the 
Roberts Court at age three, and offers some preliminary thoughts on how 
the Court may continue to evolve in the future. 
II. THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING DOCKET 
A striking aspect of the Roberts Court is the size of its docket. This 
was many years in the making. Over the past several decades, the 
Supreme Court’s docket has declined dramatically. During the late Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s tenure, the number of cases heard and decided by the 
Court was cut in half, from approximately 150 cases per term in the 
1980s to seventy-six in OT 2004.25 While Chief Justice Roberts 
indicated he would like the Court to accept more cases for review during 
his confirmation hearings, it has yet to happen.26 The Court issued 
  
 25. See David M. O’Brien, The Rehnquist Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 81 
JUDICATURE 58, 58 (1997) (“In the 1995 and 1996 terms, the Court . . . decided just 
[ninety] cases by written opinions each term, half the number of a decade ago.”);  
SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2 (“The number of decisions after argument for previous 
Terms are . . . [seventy-six] (OT04) . . . .”). 
 26. See, e.g., Associated Press, U.S. Supreme Court Accepting Fewer Cases, 
FOXNews.com (June 3, 2006), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,-
198065,00.html?sPage=fnc/us/supremecourt (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (“Chief Justice 
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opinions after briefing and argument in only sixty-eight and sixty-seven 
cases in the past two te 27rms.   
  
Any evaluation of the Roberts Court at this point must account for its 
small docket. As Dean Chemerinsky notes, the number of cases decided 
by the Court after briefing and argument is at its lowest point in over 
fifty years.28 At the time of this writing the Court has accepted 
significantly more cases than at this point during OT 2006 and OT 
2007,29 and the Court has scheduled afternoon oral arguments for the 
first time during Chief Justice Roberts’ tenure,30 but it is unclear whether 
this indicates an increase in the size of the docket or mere frontloading of 
arguments so as provide more time to craft and revise opinions. 
There are several potential explanations for the reduction in cases 
heard by the Court. Among those Dean Chemerinsky identifies are: 
increasing ideological congruity between the Supreme Court and the 
federal courts of appeals,31 strategic voting by individual justices,32 a 
decreased demand for certiorari by the Solicitor General’s office,33 and 
the reliance of most justices on the certiorari pool.34 Another factor is 
Congress’ constriction of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in 1988.35 By 
making a greater portion of the Court’s docket discretionary, Congress 
virtually ensured that the docket would shrink (though I doubt anyone 
who supported this revision expected it would shrink quite so much). 
Among the causes of the docket’s decline, the cert pool is 
particularly interesting. The pool was created in OT 1972 by Chief 
John Roberts said last fall he would like to see the U.S. Supreme Court take up more 
cases. So far, however, his arrival has had the opposite effect.”). 
 27. See  SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2; Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 
SCOTUSblog, Super StatPack—OT07, June 26, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.-
scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/superstatpackot07.pdf (last visited Mar. 
9, 2009). 
 28. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 948. 
 29. See FINDLAW, Supreme Court Docket: 2008 Term, available at http://supreme.lp.-
findlaw.com/supreme_court/docket/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
 30. Marcia Coyle, High Court, High Stakes, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at col. 2 
(“Also strikingly different is the return of afternoon oral arguments: four in October and 
three in November.”). 
 31. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 950. 
 32. Id. at 951. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Pub. Law 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). See also Bennett Boskey & Eugene 
Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81 
(1988) (observing that legislative revision “eliminates substantially all the Court’s so-
called mandatory or obligatory appeal jurisdiction” such that “[w]ith but the most minor 
of exceptions, the only path to Supreme Court review of federal and state court decisions 
is now by way of petitioning for a writ of certiorari”). 
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Justice Burger, who reportedly sought “to cut back on the Court’s work 
load.”36 In his view, preparing memoranda on the 4,500 or so petitions 
for certiorari filed each year was too much work for each justice’s 
chambers.37 Most of the current justices must share this sentiment 
because almost all of the justices partake of the pool.38 Justice Stevens 
has declined to participate in the pool for some time and, in 2008, Justice 
Alito announced that he would get out of the pool as well.39 
Dean Chemerinsky is almost certainly correct that the pool reduces 
the number of cert petitions the Court accepts. Having only one clerk 
read a petition for certiorari and draft a memorandum for multiple 
chambers reduces the likelihood that any given petition will be accepted. 
This is particularly true if, as Dean Chemerinsky and others suggest, the 
Court’s institutional norms discourage clerks from recommending a 
certiorari grant.40 It is apparently seen as worse to recommend granting 
an unworthy case than to pass over one deserving of Supreme Court 
review.  
Dean Chemerinsky may inadvertently identify another reason for 
fewer certiorari grants when he notes that when a justice does not 
participate in the cert pool it is easier to select cases with an eye toward a 
desired outcome.41 Before the pool was created, Dean Chemerinsky 
notes, the clerks in each Justice’s chambers may have reviewed petitions 
in accordance with their Justice’s preferences, as opposed to more 
neutral criteria.42 This may have resulted in cert grant recommendations 
based upon the idiosyncratic (or ideological) preferences of individual 
justices, and may have increased the potential for strategic behavior in 
the certiorari process. 
  
 36. BOB WOODWARD AND SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 272 (1979). 
 37. Id. Not all of the justices agreed. Justice Brennan opposed creation of the cert 
pool and Justice Stewart opted not to participate on the recommendation of his clerks. Id. 
at 272-73. 
 38. Tony Mauro, Justice Alito Changes Mind, Gets Out of the Pool, LEGAL TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2008. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 951-52; Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket 
Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2 (last visited Mar. 
9, 2009). 
 41. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 951 (“Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and  
Breyer may decide to vote in favor of certiorari only when they think that they have a 
reasonable chance at ultimately getting agreement from Justice Kennedy or another 
member on the Court. The same, of course, could be true for the more conservative 
Justices.”).  
 42. Id. at 951-52. 
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With a certiorari pool, worthy cases may get overlooked, but the 
requirement that each clerk write a memo for multiple justices with 
different judicial philosophies may depoliticize the certiorari process. 
The requirement that each clerk write a memo for multiple justices is 
likely to encourage the drafting of memos that focus on “neutral” criteria 
for certiorari, and discourage memos recommending cert so as to 
overturn faulty precedent or change the direction of the law. It seems 
plausible that memos written for the pool are less likely to be written 
with an eye toward producing predetermined, desired results.  
Dean Chemerinsky decries the Court’s incredible shrinking docket 
because it means “more major legal questions must wait a longer time 
before being settled.”43 He is correct that this “has enormous 
implications for lawyers, judges, and for the nation,”44 but not all of 
them are negative. While the Court’s relative reluctance to grant 
certiorari means that circuit splits and doctrinal conflicts may persist for 
a greater period, it also means that legal questions have greater time to 
percolate. If more circuit courts have the opportunity to consider a 
question of first impression, there is a greater likelihood of a circuit split 
developing, but the justices may also benefit from assessing the 
frequency with which a given question recurs and from having more of 
their Article III colleagues consider a given question. Delaying a grant of 
certiorari may also afford the political branches an opportunity to resolve 
a given controversy, thereby obviating any need for the Court to hear a 
case
ot representative of 
the 
it had the opportunity to rule on Fifth Amendment takings, the separation 
  
. 
Downsizing the docket is important for academics and court 
watchers, too. A shrunken docket, in any given year, provides a less 
reliable picture of the Court’s jurisprudence. As the Court reviews fewer 
cases, each individual term provides a less representative snapshot of the 
Court’s work. Fewer cases mean a smaller, less-representative data 
sample. As a consequence, a handful of terms are n
wide range of issues that come before the Court.  
The shrinking docket should make us particularly reluctant to 
embrace sweeping judgments about the Court’s trajectory based on any 
handful of terms. The first three years of the Roberts Court have seen 
quite a few significant cases,45 but many important issues were absent. 
The Roberts Court has not considered enumerated powers cases of the 
sort that characterized the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism,” nor has 
 43. Id. at 948. 
 44. Id.  
 45. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229; EPA, 549 U.S. 
497. 
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of church and state, commercial speech, homosexual rights, and a host of 
other important contemporary issues. 
The brief history of the Roberts Court amply illustrates the danger of 
relying upon a single term to evaluate the Court’s trajectory. Viewed in 
isolation, OT 2006 appeared to present a fiercely divided Court, driven 
along ideological lines, in which conservatives tended to triumph.46 Yet 
the term before, the Court was a model of civility and nearly 
unprecedented unanimity.47 And one year later, the Roberts Court defied 
ideological caricature. OT 2005 may be sui generis because Justices 
O’Connor and Alito split their term.48 The difference between OT 2006 
and OT 2007, however, was not turnover in personnel, but a different 
mix of cases and associated issues.  
Commentators were too quick to draw stark conclusions from the 
apparent divisions on the Court on display in OT 2006. Only one-in-four 
decisions was unanimous that term,49 and one-in-three was decided 5-
4.50 This is hardly an unprecedented level of division, however. Both OT 
2004 and OT 2001 saw approximately one-third of the Court’s decisions 
decided 5-4 as well.51 If anything was unprecedented it was the 
unusually high percentage of unanimous rulings—forty-five percent52—
and low number of 5-4 decisions—thirteen percent53—during Chief 
Justice Roberts’s first term, OT 2005, that inflated expectations.  
  
This is not to deny the very real doctrinal divisions on the Court. 
SCOTUSblog’s analysis of the “rate of dissension”—a measure of the 
number of dissents per case—found OT 2006 the most divided in recent 
years, barely edging out OT 2001, 1.82 dissents per case to 1.81.54 This 
and other measures of the Court’s may be magnified by the Court’s ever-
shrinking docket, however. As the Court grants fewer cases, those that 
remain on the docket may be more difficult, contentious, and closely 
fought on the margin. The oral statements from Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer delivering dissents in high-profile cases in OT 2006 may have 
been unusual, but they were mild compared to some of the fiery 
statements from prior years, as when the Court handed down its 
 46. See  SCOTUSblog, supra note 9. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See infra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 49. See  SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 3. 
 50. See id. at 2. 
 51. See id.  
 52. See id.  
 53. See id. at 3.  
 54. Jason Harrow, Measuring Divisiveness in OT 2006, SCOTUSblog, July 2, 2007, 
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/measuring-divisiveness-in-ot06/ (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2009). 
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decisions in two abortion-related cases, Stenberg v. Carhart55 and Hill v. 
Colorado.56 
OT 2007 was neither particularly conservative nor starkly divided. 
Approximately one third of the Court’s decisions were decided by a 5-4 
vote during OT 2006.57 In OT 2007, however, the Court split 5-4 only 
seventeen percent of the time.58 Moreover, only a handful of these 
decisions yielded ideologically predictable divisions.59 In cases 
concerning criminal sentencing,60 the definition of money laundering,61 
age discrimination,62 and federal sovereign immunity,63 the justices split 
5-4, but did not divide into “liberal” and “conservative” camps.64 It is 
simply too soon to know whether OT 2006 or OT 2007 provides a better 
picture of the “real” Roberts Court—assuming either is representative of 
the Court’s overall judicial ideology—and there are reasons to lean 
toward the latter. 
III. “THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURT SINCE THE MID-1930S”? 
Dean Chemerinsky’s primary and most provocative claim is that the 
Roberts Court at age three is “the most conservative Court since the mid-
1930s.”65 By way of explanation, he writes: 
What does it mean to say that the Court is more conservative 
than its predecessor Courts, the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren 
Courts? It is notably more conservative on the issues that in our 
society today are often the litmus tests for ideology: abortion and 
race. I also believe that it will be much more conservative on 
issues of separation of church and state, but they have not yet 
been presented to the Roberts Court. Also, it is a Court that, 
overall, is very pro-business. The one area where the Roberts 
Court has not been conservative is in its rulings against the Bush 
  
 55. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 56. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).  
 57. See  SCOTUSblog, supra note 9, at 2. 
 58. Id. at 2. This percentage includes the Court’s 5-3 decision in Stoneridge 
Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, but excludes the Court’s two 4-4 decisions in 
Warner-Lambert v. Kent and Board of Education of New York v. Tom F. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. at 4-5. 
 60. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008). 
 61. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008). 
 62. Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008). 
 63. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008). 
 64. See id. at 10-23. 
 65. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962. 
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administration’s actions as to the Guantanamo detainees. But this 
is because Justice Kennedy has joined Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer in these cases.66 
These claims are contestable in almost every particular. The Roberts 
Court at age three—that is, the Roberts Court we have seen thus far—is 
not “notably more conservative” on race and abortion than any Court of 
the past several decades. Nor is it likely that the Court, as currently 
composed, will be particularly more conservative on the question of 
church and state, and the Court’s rulings on enemy combatants are hardly 
the only significant example of where “the Roberts Court has not been 
conservative.” The claim the Roberts Court is “pro-business” is more 
plausible, as discussed in the next section, but it does not have the clear 
ideological significance Dean Chemerinsky suggests, nor is the Roberts 
Court’s treatment of business-related cases remotely comparable to the 
pre-New Deal Court.  
The basis for Dean Chemerinsky’s claim on abortion is that the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal partial birth 
abortion ban in Gonzales v. Carhart.67 This was the first time the 
Supreme Court had upheld a ban on a specific abortion procedure. The 
decision also all-but overturned its 2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart 
invalidating a similar state partial-birth abortion ban statute68 and 
signaled that the Court would be somewhat more deferential to 
government restrictions on abortion, at least when confronted with a 
facial challenge. 
Gonzales v. Carhart certainly marks a shift in the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence, but not a seismic one.69 The decision does not push the 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence back fifty, let alone seventy-plus, years. 
The Court did not recognize a constitutional right to an abortion until 
1973.70 That right, as subsequently limited in Planned Parenthood v. 
  
 66. Id. at 956. 
 67. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
 68. 550 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 69. One way in which the Gonzales decision does appear to be significantly different 
from its predecessors is in the rhetoric of the opinion particularly the continued reference 
to the fetus as an “unborn child” in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court. See 
Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 958. At the same time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in Gonazales referred to those who perform abortions as “doctors,” whereas in his 
Stenberg v. Carhart dissent he used the term “abortionist.” Compare Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 
at 1622 (“This is an abortion doctor’s clinical description.”) with Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, 
947 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The majority views the procedures from the 
perspective of the abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when 
confronted with a new method of ending human life.”). 
 70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Casey,71 is still recognized by a majority of justices on the Court. While 
there are at least two Justices, Scalia and Thomas, who are prepared to 
overturn Casey and Roe, there remain five justices, including two of the 
three justices who authored the joint opinion in Casey, who still embrace 
a constitutional right to abortion. 
Dean Chemerinsky writes that Gonzales v. Carhart changed the 
standard from Casey and Stenberg for evaluating the constitutionality of 
abortion restrictions because it held that an abortion restriction is not 
facially unconstitutional unless it imposes an undue burden on a “large 
fraction of women.”72 This is certainly a change from Stenberg, in which 
the Court held that an abortion restriction would be unconstitutional if it 
placed an undue burden on some women, but it is also broadly consistent 
with Casey (and completely foreshadowed by Justice Kennedy’s 
Stenberg dissent). The “undue burden” test as applied in Stenberg was 
arguably more restrictive of state legislatures than as announced in 
Casey, so a repudiation of Stenberg on this point is not tantamount to a 
rejection of a constitutionally protected abortion right, let alone the 
reversal of 35 years of progressive abortion jurisprudence. 
In Casey, the Court upheld the imposition of a 24-hour waiting 
period against a facial challenge despite the fact that such a restriction 
could impose an undue burden on some women. The joint opinion signed 
by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor and Souter explicitly rejected the claim 
that the particularly burdensome effects of the waiting period on some 
women rendered the provision facially unconstitutional.73 The same 
Court invalidated Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement, but 
not because it placed “an undue burden on some women” as Dean 
Chemerinsky claims.74 Rather, the Court explained, it concluded that the 
“spousal notification requirement is . . . likely to prevent a significant 
number of women from obtaining an abortion.”75 In Gonzales v. 
Carhart, on the other hand, the Court did not find that the federal law 
would “prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an 
abortion.”76 To the contrary, it expressed doubt whether the law in 
question would bar any women from obtaining an abortion at all, and left 
  
 71. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 72. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639. 
 73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87. 
 74. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 958 (emphasis added). 
 75. 505 U.S. at 893 (emphasis added). See also id. at 992 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part) (“The joint opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an 
important factor in the “undue burden” analysis is whether the regulation “prevent[s] a 
significant number of women from obtaining an abortion.”) (emphasis added). 
 76. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.  
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open the possibility of an as-applied challenge for those women who 
might be placed at risk if denied the prohibited procedure.  
  
More broadly, there is no indication the current Court is prepared to 
further limit the abortion right as recognized in Casey and Roe, nor is 
there any evidence that the Court is prepared to curtail other rights to 
sexual autonomy recognized by the Court in the past several decades. 
The Roberts Court has given no indication that it would adopt a more 
restrictive test for the recognition of fundamental rights protected by the 
Due Process Clause than was announced in Washington v. Glucksberg.77 
Furthermore, there are at least five justices on the Court who support the 
holding of Lawrence v. Texas,78 arguably the most liberal opinion on 
sexual liberty in the Court’s history, let alone the last seventy years. That 
the current Court is unlikely to plow new ground in this area is not 
sufficient to make it “notably more conservative” than those that have 
come before. 
Dean Chemerinsky’s assertion that the Roberts Court at age three is 
the “most conservative” Court since before Brown v. Board of 
Education79 does not hold up in the context of race either. Nor does his 
more modest claim that the current Court is “notably more conservative” 
than “the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts.”80 As with abortion, it 
is reasonable to maintain that the replacement of Justice O’Connor with 
Justice Alito has made the Supreme Court modestly more conservative, 
but not to maintain that the current Court has signaled its intent—let 
alone already effectuated—a dramatic turn to the right. 
In assessing this claim, it is important to clarify what it means for a 
justice (or the Court) to be “conservative” on the question of race. 
According to Dean Chemerinsky, the conservative position on race is 
that which was embraced by Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1.81 Specifically, the conservative position is that “the government must 
be colorblind in its decisions,”82 and that all race-conscious government 
policies, including those intended to benefit historically disadvantaged 
 77. 521 U.S. 707 (1997) (holding that there is no a fundamental right to doctor-
assisted suicide under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 78. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute which rendered certain sexual 
acts between members of the same sex a crime was unconstitutional). 
 79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Note that in claiming that the Roberts Court is the “most 
conservative” Court since the 1930s, he implicitly—if perhaps unintentionally—suggests 
that the current Court is more “conservative” on the question of race than the New Deal 
Court that accepted “separate but equal” and upheld Japanese internment. 
 80. Chemerinsky, supra note 13 at 956. 
 81. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 82. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962. 
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racial minorities, must be subject to the most exacting scrutiny. To 
sustain his claim, Dean Chemerinsky must show that the Roberts Court 
has shown itself to be more conservative in this regard than its 
predecessors, and this is something he fails to do. 
In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that two school 
districts’ voluntary attempts to achieve greater racial balance throughout 
their jurisdictions were unconstitutional insofar as they relied upon a 
student’s race when making school assignment decisions. Four justices, 
led by Chief Justice Roberts, suggested that this was an easy case: “The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.”83 Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s 
judgment that the school assignment plans at issue should be subject to 
strict scrutiny and, as implemented, were unconstitutional. Yet Justice 
Kennedy was not willing to embrace colorblindness as “a universal 
constitutional principle,” thereby forfeiting the possibility that school 
districts could profitably consider race in order to encourage more 
diverse student bodies.84 Along with the dissenters, Justice Kennedy 
explicitly accepted that combating “racial isolation” and achieving a 
racially diverse student population is a “compelling interest” that could 
justify narrowly tailored race conscious policies.85 
At least superficially, Parents Involved echoes the result in Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke.86 Four justices embraced strict 
colorblindness;87 four justices sought to impose a relaxed version of 
heightened scrutiny to race-conscious policies designed to overcome the 
legacy of segregation; and one justice split the difference. In each case, 
the median justice—Justice Powell in Bakke, Justice Kennedy in Parents 
Involved—accepted the dissenters’ view that diversity in education could 
be a compelling governmental interest, but rejected the specific 
educational policy at issue for being excessively blunt or crude in its use 
of race.  
Parents Involved is arguably more “conservative” than Bakke insofar 
as Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is less permissive than Justice 
Powell’s. At the very least, Justice Kennedy’s rejection of the University 
of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan in Grutter v. 
  
 83. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 84. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 85. Id.  
 86. 438 U.S. 265 
 87. It should be noted that the four justice plurality in Bakke would have invalidated 
the challenged admissions plan on statutory, as opposed to constitutional grounds. 
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Bollinger88 shows that he embraces a less permissive understanding of 
the Equal Protection Clause than did Justice O’Connor in the latter part 
of her career.89 As a consequence, Dean Chemerinsky may be correct to 
predict that the Roberts Court would decide Grutter differently than did 
the Rehnquist Court.90 Yet more is required for Chemerinsky to validate 
his larger claim. 
Even accepting that Parents Involved represents a rightward shift 
from Grutter does not establish that the Roberts Court is more 
conservative on race than the Rehnquist, Burger, and Warren Courts. 
Due to Justice Kennedy, it is reasonable to view Parents Involved as 
more accommodating of race-based remedial measures than either City 
of Richmond v. Croson91 or Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.92 These 
opinions, taken together, could support an argument that at least the pre-
Grutter Rehnquist Court was as conservative on race as the Roberts 
Court has shown itself to be thus far.  
Dean Chemerinsky suspects the Roberts Court will be “particularly 
more conservative on the question of church and state” once it is 
presented with a significant Establishment Clause case. He may well be 
right, at least with regard to the approval of religious displays, but he 
offers no evidence in support of this claim. Even if one assumes that 
Justice Alito will adopt a more permissive approach to the Establishment 
Clause than did Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy’s continued presence 
as the swing vote in Establishment Clause cases suggests that any 
doctrinal change will be relatively modest.  
In a pair of 2005 cases, Van Orden v. Perry93 and McCreary County 
v. ACLU of Kentucky,94 Justice Kennedy showed himself to be more 
tolerant of public displays of religious symbols than was Justice 
O’Connor. As a consequence, the Roberts Court may approve religious 
displays that would have been invalidated by the late Rehnquist Court. 
Yet there is reason to doubt that there will be any more significant 
changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Among other things, 
  
 88. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School had a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body and that its admissions program 
was narrowly tailored to achieve this objective). 
 89. Epstein, Ideological Drift, supra note 2, at 1535 (noting Justice O’Connor’s shift 
to the left and suggesting Justice O’Connor would have been less likely to support the 
University of Michigan Law School earlier in her career). 
 90. But see Epstein, Bush Imprint, supra note 8, at 666-67 (casting doubt on claim 
Justice O’Connor would have supported school districts in Parents Involved cases). 
 91. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 92. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 93. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 94. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
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Justice Kennedy authored the opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, in 
which the Court held prayers delivered by clergy at a public high school 
graduation unconstitutional.95 There are almost certainly at least five 
justices on the Court who would support that result today, as well as that 
from Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, in which the Court 
likewise held unconstitutional student-delivered prayers at public high 
school football games.96  
The Roberts Court has indicated a willingness to enforce strict 
limitations on taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases, but this 
has not resulted in a shift in the Court’s underlying constitutional 
jurisprudence. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., the 
Court held that denying taxpayer standing to a group alleging that 
activities of the President’s “faith-based initiative” violated the 
establishment clause.97 In doing so the Court reaffirmed the general rule 
that an individual’s status as a taxpayer, without more, is insufficient to 
establish Article III standing. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the 
slight exception to this rule established in Flast v. Cohen that allows for 
taxpayer standing to challenge legislative enactments that allegedly 
violate the Establishment Clause.98 The Court’s holding reaffirmed a 
distinction between such challenges to legislative and executive actions 
articulated in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
the Separation of Church and State,99 and other post-Flast cases.100 
While most of the justices acknowledged that Flast is an anomaly in the 
Court’s standing jurisprudence, the Court left Flast standing.101 So not 
only is there no evidence to suggest the Court is prepared to lurch 
rightward on Establishment clause issues, there has been no change in 
the Court’s willingness to hear Establishment Clause challenges to 
government conduct. 
Abortion, race, and religion are certainly questions of constitutional 
law that divide contemporary conservatives and liberals. So too do the 
questions of executive power and the extent to which constitutional 
protections, such as the writ of habeas corpus, apply to alleged enemy 
  
 95. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 96. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 97. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). 
 98. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 99. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 100. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 628 (2004) (“In 
the years following Flast, the Court embarked on a process of limiting the federal 
taxpayer standing doctrine.”). 
 101. For some discussion of the problems with the Flast exception reaffirmed in Hein 
see Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer and the Lorax, 20 REG. U L. REV. 175 
(2008). 
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combatants detained in the war on terror. As a general rule, judicial 
conservatives are more deferential to assertions of Presidential 
prerogative in military and foreign affairs, while judicial liberals are 
more responsive to habeas claims or constraints on military power. On 
these issues, the Roberts Court has not been conservative at all. To the 
contrary, it has arguably been the most liberal or progressive Court ever. 
Throughout the nation’s history, the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to impose constitutional constraints on national security 
measures.102 As Chief Justice Rehnquist chronicled in All the Laws But 
One, the timing of judicial consideration has tended to influence the 
treatment of civil liberties during wartime.103 As a descriptive matter, 
courts are more likely to constrain federal authority and defend civil 
liberties after the cessation of hostilities than during the pendency of 
armed conflict or a perceived emergency.104 Throughout the Civil War, 
World War I, and World War II, in addition to lesser conflicts, few 
constitutional constraints were imposed on the political branches.105 
Indeed, this may help explain (though not excuse) some of the federal 
government’s grossest excesses, and the Supreme Court’s most shameful 
examples of judicial passivity.106 
Given the history of judicial deference to wartime assertions of 
federal power, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld107 and Boumediene v. Bush108 are 
remarkable opinions, particularly the latter. While Dean Chemerinsky 
frames these cases in terms of judicial oversight of executive authority 
and notes each was a rebuke to the Bush Administration,109 they were 
much more. Boumediene in particular represents a judicial rebuke to both 
political branches as the Court invalidated Congress’ attempt to authorize 
the Bush Administration’s with regard to the detention and trial of enemy 
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay. Never before had a 
Congressionally authorized assertion of the war power been held to be 
unconstitutional during a time of armed conflict. Right or wrong, this 
was a dramatic legal development that few would characterize as 
conservative. 
  
 102. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME 221 (1998) (noting “the reluctance of courts to decide a case against the 
government on an issue of national security during a war”). 
 103. Id. at 224. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 223 (“The Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1944); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 107. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 108. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 109. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 972-73. 
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The enemy combatant cases are hardly the sole example of the Court 
adopting “liberal” positions.110 In a series of decisions over the past three 
years a five justice majority has continued to chip away at the imposition 
of the death penalty.111 Most notably among these has been Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, in which the Court declared it unconstitutional to impose the 
death penalty for a crime, such as child rape, that did not result in the 
death of the victim.112 As originally issued, the opinion purported to be 
based, in part, on the existence of an emerging national consensus 
against the use of capital punishment in such circumstances.113 Yet when 
revealed that part of the Court’s analysis rested on an erroneous claim, 
specifically the majority opinion’s assertion that no federal law 
authorized the imposition of the death penalty, Justice Kennedy made 
clear that his, and the Court’s, judgment rested on its determination that 
executing a brutal child rapist was unwise, inhuman, and unjust—and 
therefore must be unconstitutional.114  
As important as Boumediene, Kennedy, and other cases in which the 
Court deviated from its conservative reputation, arguably the most 
consequential decision of the OT 2006—albeit one curiously omitted 
from Dean Chemerinsky’s list of important cases115—was Massachusetts 
v. EPA.116 In this case, the Court loosened the constitutional 
requirements for standing under Article III and altered other long-
standing administrative law doctrines en route to authorizing (and in 
effect mandating) the most expansive environmental regulatory 
undertaking o 117f all time.   
  
The Massachusetts majority announced a new doctrine of “special 
solicitude” to standing claims by sovereign states and a dramatically 
 110. Dean Chemerinsky acknowledges that the Court has embraced liberal positions in 
other cases as well. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 972. 
 111. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), modified 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008); 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 530 U.S. 233 
(2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 530 U.S. 286 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 
(2007). 
 112. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-46. 
 113. Id. at 2651-58. 
 114. Id. 2658-65. 
 115. See Chemerinsky, supra note 953-55. 
 116. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 117. For one account of how broadly Massachusetts v. EPA may have altered 
administrative law doctrine, see Ronald Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient 
Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
For this author’s view, see Jonathan H. Adler. Warming Up to Climate Change 
Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63 (2007), available at http://www.virginialaw-
review.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
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relaxed application of standing requirements in citizen suit claims filed 
against federal regulatory agencies.118 The Court also adopted an 
expansive reading of what constitutes an “air pollutant” under the Clean 
Air Act so as to authorize the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, 
despite the agency’s disclaimer of any such authority, and rejected the 
agency’s decision not to initiate regulation.119 As a consequence, the 
Environmental Protection Agency is now obligated to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, and will inevitably be 
forced to regulate other greenhouse gas emissions as well. In both 
practical and doctrinal terms, Massachusetts v. EPA was a monumental 
decision, and it was not the work of a “conservative” court.  
If the Court is not notably more conservative than its predecessors, is 
it at least notably conservative in comparison to the nation? Not 
particularly. On the major issues of the day, the Court’s holdings are at 
the center, if not slightly to the left, of the American public. During the 
2008 presidential campaign, both major party candidates criticized the 
Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana invalidating the death penalty 
for the crime of child rape and embraced the Court’s holding that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms. 
As Stuart Taylor observes: 
To locate the Court’s current doctrines on the spectrum of public 
opinion, consider six of the most contentious subjects that come 
before the justices on a recurring basis: abortion; race; religion; 
the death penalty; gay rights; and presidential war powers. On 
every one of them, the Court’s precedents are to the left of, or 
very close to the center.120 
Any purported conservatism in each of these areas, save affirmative 
action, comes from the Court’s unwillingness to invalidate policies 
adopted through the Democratic process. Thus whatever the merits of the 
Court’s decisions in these areas, they do not show the Court to be out of 
  
 118. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
 119. Id. at 528-32. 
 120. Stuart Taylor Jr., Barbarians on the Bench?, NAT’L J., July 12, 2008, at 16, 
available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/or_20080712_9445.php (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2009). Senator and Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama’s 
criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana holding the death 
penalty for child rape unconstitutional and his embrace of District of Columbia v. 
Heller’s, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), central holding that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to keep and bear arms is further evidence that, on the most contentious 
issues of the day, the Court is not to the right of American politics. 
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step with the American public, nor are they the product of a “far-right” 
court.121  
IV. A “PRO-BUSINESS” COURT? 
Another component of Dean Chemerinsky’s argument is that the 
current Court is “pro-business,” particularly in comparison to its 
predecessors. Specifically, Dean Chemerinsky claims “the Roberts Court 
is the most pro-business Court of any since the mid-1930s.”122 Dean 
Chemerinsky is not alone in suggesting the Roberts Court is “pro-
business” or drawing comparisons to the pre-New Deal Court.123 To 
support his claim, Dean Chemerinsky points to the Court’s decisions in 
the areas of punitive damages, employment discrimination, and 
preemption.124 Elsewhere Dean Chemerinsky has suggested decisions in 
other areas, such as antitrust, conform to the same pattern.125 He largely 
ignores other areas of business-related law, such as environmental 
regulation, that would post a distinct challenge to his thesis.126  
Dean Chemerinsky is likely correct that, in important respects, the 
Roberts Court could be seen as “pro-business.” But this is not because 
the Court has been particularly aggressive in striking down government 
regulation or erecting constitutional barriers to economic regulation. This 
is no pre-New Deal Court. Nor is the Court’s apparent solicitude for 
business concerns particularly rigid or ideological. To the contrary, the 
results in most business law cases are quite lopsided, and rarely the result 
of an ideological division on the Court.127 In this area, 5-4 cases are the 
  
 121. Taylor, supra note 84, at 16 (“The point here is not that the public is always right; 
. . . The point is that it’s misleading to brand as “far-right” and “radical” positions that in 
fact are more liberal than, or near the center of, mainstream public opinion.”). 
 122. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962. 
 123. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 124. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 962-72. 
 125. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court: Sharp Turn to the Right, CAL. B. J., 
Aug. 2007, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_cbj.jsp?sCategory-
Path=/Home/Attorney%20Resources/California%20Bar%20Journal/August2007&sCatHt
mlPath=cbj/2007-08_TH_01_supremecourt.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 126. See infra notes 127-175 and discussion therein. See also Envtl. Def. v. Duke 
Energy, Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and 
the Roberts Court: A Preliminary Examination, __ SANTA CLARA L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 127. Michael Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Sept. 20, 
2007, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26834/pub_detail.asp (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2009) (“The Court’s business cases are not the products of an 
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exception, not the rule.128 As a consequence, Dean Chemerinsky’s “pro-
business” charge fits uneasily as part of his broader argument that the 
confirmation of Justices Roberts and Alito have forged a working 
conservative majority. 
Business-related cases appear to occupy a major share of the Roberts 
Court’s shrunken docket—over one-third of the cases accepted and 
argued in each of the past three terms.129 It also appears that business 
advocates have had a relatively successful run of late. In OT 2006, for 
example, the litigation arm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed 
briefs in fifteen cases, winning thirteen.130 This may be evidence that the 
business community has tremendous influence on the Court. Or it may 
indicate that its attorneys are particularly good at picking winners and 
marshalling the organization’s resources for those cases in which it can 
have the greatest impact. 
Some call the Court “pro-business” because there is no crusading 
liberal or “progressive” justice on the Court. There is no justice ready to 
follow William O. Douglas’ counsel to “bend the law in favor of the 
environment and against the corporations.”131 But this, in itself, does not 
make the Court pro-business, particularly as there are no justices on the 
Court ready to do the opposite. Rather, most justices appear to approach 
the majority of business law cases as legal questions deserving of careful 
legal analysis and resolution in accordance with the dictates of law.132 
  
ideologically divided, bloc- and swing-vote-driven Court. To the contrary, they display a 
remarkable degree of judicial consensus. Even when the consensus breaks, the fault line 
rarely follows ideological expectations.”) (emphasis added). 
 128. Even in OT 2006, the Court’s business-related docket was relatively free of 
narrow divisions. Of the twenty-five business-related cases the Court heard that term, ten 
were decided unanimously, eight were decided 8-1 or 7-2, and only three were split 5-4. 
Id. at 3. If the net is cast more broadly, the results are the same. See Rosen, supra note 
123. (“Of the [thirty] business cases last term, [twenty-two] were decided unanimously, 
or with only one or two dissenting votes.”). 
 129. There is some ambiguity as to what constitutes a “business” case, and different 
commentators have counted the cases differently. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 123 
(“Forty percent of the cases the court heard last term involved business interests, up from 
around 30 percent in recent years”); Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, supra note 
127, at 1 (“In the 2006 term, twenty-five of sixty-seven cases dealt with business-related 
issues.”). Whatever approach one uses, however, it is clear that the business-related 
docket is a significant portion of the whole. 
 130. Rosen, supra note 123. The Chamber’s Robin Conrad called it their “best 
Supreme Court term ever.” See Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision 
Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at D01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803.-
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). 
 131. Rosen, supra note 123. 
 132. See Greve, supra note 127. 
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With the exception of the punitive damages cases, the Court’s business 
docket focuses on statutory matters in which Congress retains the upper 
hand. Most cases require the Court to interpret or apply and enforce 
legislative accommodations, and leave Congress ample room to correct 
course. Had the Roberts Court invalidated the federal partial-birth 
abortion ban, no legislature could have reenacted an equivalent measure. 
Yet after the Court rejected Lily Ledbetter’s pay discrimination claim,133 
Congress retained the ability to revise the statute so subsequent claims 
could go forward—as it did in early 2009.134 
It is difficult to know what constitutes “pro-business” in a given 
case, as many (if not most) business-related cases pit one business 
against another. The Roberts Court’s antitrust decisions, for instance, 
have certainly sided with the defendants, all of which have been 
businesses.135 Yet the plaintiffs in all but one of the Roberts Court’s 
antitrust cases have been businesses as well.136 These cases are not so 
much “pro-business” as they are “pro-market” or “pro-consumer 
welfare” and embody a Chicago School approach to antitrust analysis.137 
Large portions of the business community may favor this approach, but it 
does not necessarily represent a business-oriented jurisprudence. Further, 
because the Supreme Court’s antitrust cases are not a representative 
sample of antitrust cases generally, it is a mistake to conflate plaintiff or 
defendant win rates with a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias.138 
The Roberts Court, as a whole, has shown itself no more enamored 
of large punitive damage awards than had been the Rehnquist Court. In 
two decisions, Philip Morris USA v. Williams139 and Exxon Shipping Co. 
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v. Baker,140 a divided Court struck down punitive damages awards as 
excessive.141 These decisions are certainly “pro-business,” insofar as the 
business community has actively sought to reduce punitive damages in 
civil litigation, yet they are not evidence of an increasing conservative tilt 
on the Court.  
The Supreme Court first held that “grossly excessive” punitive 
damage awards violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1996 in BMW of North America v. Gore.142 This 
prohibition is in addition to the procedural safeguards state and federal 
courts must follow before allowing the award of punitive damages.143 
Since BMW, the Court has continued to police the award of “excessive” 
punitive damages.144  
Given the Court’s commitment to enforcing both procedural and 
substantive limits on the award of punitive damages under the Due 
Process Clause, its decision to reject a $79.5 million punitive damage 
award on top of $821,000 in compensatory damages in Philip Morris did 
not represent a major shift in the Court’s jurisprudence.145 Nor did it 
represent a particularly conservative result. Both Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissented in Philip Morris,146 as they had in BMW.147 Whatever 
their views of punitive damage awards generally, neither believes such 
awards are meaningfully restrained by the Due Process Clause. This is no 
less a “conservative” view than the more business-friendly hostility to 
large punitive awards embraced by Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.148 
The decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker presented a slightly 
more traditional right-left split on the Court—Justice Souter wrote the 
majority opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—but involved a much narrower question 
of law.149 Here, the Court rejected a multi-billion-dollar punitive damage 
award that was several times the compensatory damages found.150 Yet 
  
 140. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 141. Id.  
 142. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 143. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (holding punitive 
damage awards must be subject to appellate review). 
 144. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 145. See Philip Morris , 549 U.S. 346. 
 146. Id. at 361-64. 
 147. BMW of N. America, 517 U.S. at 598-607. 
 148. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 348. The other justices in the majority were the Chief 
Justice and Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Alito. 
 149. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 150. Id. The Court also split 4-4 over whether a corporate defendant could be liable for 
punitive damages for the acts of its managerial employees and unanimously rejected 
 
1006 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:983 
the Court did not rest its judgment on the Due Process Clause. Indeed, 
the Court did not even consider whether the award was “grossly 
excessive” under BMW.151 Rather, the Court only considered the narrow 
question of whether, under the federal common law, such a punitive 
award was excessive in a maritime case.152 As a consequence, the import 
of the Court’s holding is quite limited. 
In the context of employment discrimination law, the evidence for a 
conservative, pro-business swing in the Court’s jurisprudence is even 
weaker. Dean Chemerinsky focuses his discussion on the case of 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Co.,153 in which a conservative, five-
justice majority held that a civil rights plaintiff’s pay discrimination 
claims were precluded by the relevant statute of limitations.154 
Specifically, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that each 
separate paycheck represented a stand-alone violation of the Civil Rights 
Act from which the statute of limitations should run.155 Rather, the Court 
held, the statute of limitations began to run when the initial “discrete 
discriminatory act” occurred.156 
The Ledbetter decision could have made it more difficult for victims 
of prior pay discrimination to file claims under the Civil Rights Act. Yet 
as Dean Chemerinsky notes, the extent of the impact will be dependent 
upon whether the statute of limitations is tolled if an employee is 
unaware the pay discrimination has occurred, and the Court did not 
address this question.157 Further, the decision does not affect pay 
discrimination claims filed under other federal statutes, such as the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, and in early 2009 Congress passed legislation to 
reverse the Court’s decision.158 
Even assuming that Ledbetter was a radically conservative, pro-
business decision that altered long-standing employment discrimination 
legal doctrines, it was not the only employment discrimination case the 
Roberts Court decided in its first three years. As Dean Chemerinsky 
notes, the Supreme Court decided three other employment discrimination 
cases in OT 2007, and in each case ruled in favor of the employee and 
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against the employer.159 These three cases, each of which concerned the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, are potentially important cases, 
and undermine the claim that the Roberts Court is reflexively pro-
business. 
The third area of business-related cases Dean Chemerinsky examines 
involve preemption. As a general matter, the business community 
generally urges federal courts to find that state regulations and tort 
liability are preempted by federal law, and such claims have been quite 
successful in the Roberts Court thus far. “Every preemption case decided 
so far by the Roberts Court has been decided in favor of finding 
preemption,” Chemerinsky notes.160 This was true when Dean 
Chemerinsky wrote it. Since then, however, the Court rejected the 
tobacco industry’s claims that some state law deceptive practice claims 
are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.161 
Moreover, other than in this tobacco case, Altria v. Good, the Roberts 
Court’s preemption decisions demonstrate almost no signs of the Court’s 
ideological divisions.  
Most of the Roberts Court’s preemption decisions thus far have been 
decided by quite lopsided margins. Riegel v. Medtronic162 is perhaps the 
most controversial of the Court’s recent preemption decisions, and it was 
decided 8-1.163 So, too, was Preston v. Ferrer, decided on the same 
day.164 Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter in Riegel;165 Justice 
Thomas in Ferrer.166 The third preemption case decided that day, Rowe 
v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association was unanimous.167 This 
was not an aberration from OT 2007. The biggest preemption case from 
OT 2005, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,168 was unanimous as well. 
Where the cases have been closer, the lack of predictable ideological 
division has remained. In Watters v. Wachovia,169 for example, the Court 
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considered the preemptive effect of regulations governing mortgage 
lenders promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
under the National Bank Act. The Court held, 5-3, that state licensing 
and reporting requirements for mortgage lenders are preempted by these 
regulations.170 Of particular interest was the Court’s lineup. Justice 
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for herself and Justices Kennedy, 
Souter, Breyer, and Alito.171 Justice Stevens dissented, joined by the 
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia.172 Of further note, this was the first case 
in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito disagreed, but it would 
not be the last.  
In the preemption cases, as in other business-related areas of the law, 
it does appear that the Court, as a whole, is generally receptive to the 
positions advocated by the business community. But insofar as this is the 
case, it does not particularly support Dean Chemerinsky’s argument that 
the Roberts Court is notably more conservative than its predecessors.173 
The Roberts Court’s pro-business leanings are independent of—and in 
some cases in conflict with—its alleged conservative inclinations.  
To the extent the Roberts Court is pro-business, it is not so because it 
has embraced an aggressive agenda to impose constitutional constraints 
on the government’s power to regulate economic activity or to rewrite 
the law to favor business interests. In business-related areas other than 
those analyzed by Dean Chemerinsky, such as environmental regulation, 
the Court has been anything but sympathetic to business concerns.174 
Rather, the Roberts Court can be called pro-business insofar as it is 
sympathetic to some basic business-oriented legal claims, reads statutes 
narrowly, resists finding implied causes of action,175 has adopted a 
skeptical view of antitrust complaints, and does not place its finger on 
the scales to assist non-business litigants. This is pro-business, to a 
degree, and may even qualify as “conservative,” but it is also a more 
modest orientation than Dean Chemerinsky would suggest. 
V. COURTING JUSTICE KENNEDY 
Dean Chemerinsky suggests that calling this Court, the “Roberts 
Court,” may be something of a misnomer. Instead, he suggests, the 
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current Court is more accurately described as the “Anthony Kennedy 
Court.”176 There is something to this claim. Yet insofar as the Roberts 
Court at age three is really the Kennedy Court, this only undermines 
Dean Chemerinsky’s claim that the Roberts Court is the “most 
conservative” court since Justice Kennedy was born.177 
The claim that the Roberts Court is really the “Kennedy Court” is not 
new.178 After OT 2006, it appeared that Justice Kennedy literally 
controlled the outcome in close cases. During that term he voted with the 
majority in all twenty-four 5-4 decisions, even those that did not break 
along ideological lines.179 No other justice came close.180 Perhaps even 
more remarkably, Justice Kennedy only cast two dissenting votes over 
the course of the entire term.181 As the Court issued opinions in sixty-
eight cases, this means that Justice Kennedy was in the majority a 
remarkable ninety-seven percent of the time. 
Justice Kennedy’s influence on case outcomes was not nearly so 
pronounced in OT 2007.182 He cast ten dissenting votes, and was in the 
minority for several 5-4 decisions.183 Rather than Justice Kennedy it was 
Chief Justice Roberts who joined the Court’s prevailing side most often 
(ninety percent). Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion in four of the Court’s 5-4 decisions, including Boumediene v. 
Bush,184 Kennedy v. Louisiana,185 Stoneridge Investment Partners v. 
Scientific-Atlanta,186 and Dada v. Mukasey.187 So even as his influence 
waned, Justice Kennedy remained a pivotal justice.  
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Insofar as the current court is more properly considered Kennedy 
Court, this further undermines Dean Chemerinsky’s claim of a 
particularly conservative court. While Justice Kennedy is a moderately 
conservative justice on most issues, he is anything but a reliable 
“conservative” vote on a wide-range of politically charged issues. Justice 
Kennedy frequently joins his more liberal colleagues in some of the most 
contentious and controversial cases, including those involving capital 
punishment, executive authority, standing, and sexual liberty. Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy’s ideological separation from the next most 
conservative justices on the Court is one of the things that makes such an 
important median justice—what some would call a “super median.”188 
Justice Kennedy is the least likely member of the Court to uphold 
government restrictions on speech.189 Thus, he joined Justices Scalia and 
Thomas in urging the Court to overturn portions of the Court’s 2003 
decision in McConnell v. FEC190 and void federal limits on political 
advertising adopted as part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance 
reforms, rejecting the incremental approach adopted by Chief Justice 
Roberts that would have preserved the recent precedent.191 He also 
joined Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse v. Frederick,192 the “Bong 
hits 4 Jesus” case, to ensure the Court’s ruling would not permit limits on 
political speech by students.193 Justice Kennedy was also the only 
member of the Court to embrace the narrow holding of Flast v. Cohen,194 
rejecting the more conservative justices’ desire to revisit (if not overturn) 
the holding that taxpayers could have standing to challenge legislative 
enactments that violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.195 
If Roberts and Alito are consistent minimalists, Justice Kennedy has 
a “maximalist” streak, making him the justice least likely to defer to the 
political branches and among the most likely to reconsider past 
precedents. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens’ opinion for the 
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA that expanded citizen standing to sue for 
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the violation of environmental laws and effectively ordered the EPA to 
begin the federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.196 As noted 
above, this decision worked a dramatic change in several doctrinal areas 
and could have profound economic and political implications. Kennedy 
also wrote the majority opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. 
PSKS, Inc.,197 overturning a decades-old antitrust precedent,198 and 
another in Panetti v. Quarterman adopting an innovative and expansive 
interpretation of federal law allowing convicted criminal defendants to 
file additional habeas corpus petitions.199 It was also Justice Kennedy 
who embraced the consideration of international law and the Court’s own 
moral compass to invalidate the death penalty for child rape in Kennedy 
v. Louisiana.200  
Justice Kennedy has an over-sized impact on the Court’s decisions 
because he is the median justice. Indeed, as noted above, Justice 
Kennedy is something of a “super-median.”201 A consequence is that the 
Court’s jurisprudence will often reflect Justice Kennedy’s own: mildly 
conservative in many areas of the law, but not so conservative in several 
areas of profound significance. So long as Justice Kennedy is the median 
justice, it will be hard to argue that we have the “most conservative” 
Court since Justice Kennedy was born. 
VI. WHEN THE ROBERTS COURT COMES OF AGE 
As noted at the outset, it is difficult to know much about any court 
after three years, and this is particularly true of the Roberts Court. With 
an incredibly shrunken docket, and a lineup of justices that is likely to 
change, any definitive judgment about the Court, or even its newest 
justices, would be premature. Among other things, the issues upon which 
Court commentators fixate today are unlikely to be those that preoccupy 
the Court in the future. Nor are present ideological divisions likely to 
dominate for an extended period of time. Today’s left-right divisions 
over abortion and race could easily be eclipsed by the sorts of divisions 
observed in other lines of cases, such as those between formalists and 
pragmatists in the Apprendi-Booker sentencing guideline cases.202 There 
is also no way to know how the justices continued interaction, or the 
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potential addition of new justices in the years to come, will alter the 
Court’s behavior. So even if we think we know the Roberts Court well at 
this point, we must be ready to change our minds. 
That said, is there any way the current Court could be called 
“conservative?” There are certainly some issues, including the 
constitutional protection of campaign-related speech and gun rights, 
where the Court is to the right of its predecessors. On gun rights in 
particular, it would be fair to call this Court the “most conservative” 
since the 1930s, as there has never before been an opinion recognizing an 
individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.203 
But this case does not establish that we have a particularly conservative 
Court, overall. 
It would also be fair to suggest the Roberts Court, right now, has a 
more conservative trajectory. That is to say that unlike its predecessors—
the Warren and Burger Courts in particular—this Court appears unlikely 
to embrace the continued progressive evolution of constitutional law 
doctrines in the coming decades. In most areas, it seems more likely to 
maintain, and refine, the status quo. The Roberts Court also seems 
inclined to decide most cases as narrowly as possible, producing few 
seismic shifts in any direction. Insofar as it can be maintained, this is 
certainly a more modest or “conservative” approach to judging than the 
Court has demonstrated in recent decades. It is also a far more 
conservative approach to the law than what many would like or expect, 
even if it does not make the Court the “most conservative” since before 
the New Deal.  
A final way the Roberts Court may be called conservative is in its 
apparent tendency to decide cases on the most narrow available grounds. 
In cases across a range of controversial issues—lethal injection,204 voter 
ID,205 abortion,206 child pornography,207 among others—cases that were 
expected to divide 5-4 were instead decided on narrow grounds by larger 
majorities. This so-called minimalist approach narrows the range of 
disagreement among the justices and minimizes doctrinal changes. In 
many ways this is a significantly more conservative approach to judicial 
review than exhibited by prior courts—and it may well become the 
hallmark of the Roberts Court. 
In sum, the Roberts Court has yet to show itself as dramatically more 
ideologically conservative than its predecessors, let alone any Court in 
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over 70 years. Such a modest and tentative assessment of the Roberts 
Court may not excite the passions or motivate the base. Overstating the 
Court’s ideological orientation has great appeal. Yet getting the Roberts 
Court right is more important that proving the Roberts Court is right 
already. 
 
